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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the dynamics of European government bond market conta-
gion during the financial crisis and, subsequently, during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Following Bae et al. (2003), we use the coexceedance variable—joint occurrences 
of extreme negative and positive returns in different countries on a given day—to 
measure contagion. We also analyze the underlying determinants of the dynamics of con-
tagion using an ordered logistic regression. Our results reveal that interest rates, stock 
market returns and market volatility help explain contagion in European government 
bond markets; however, their individual relevance varies from crisis to crisis. We also 
find that past contagion significantly increases the probability of more episodes of con-
tagion today. Finally, we find statistically significant evidence of contagion from 
the “old” European Monetary Union (EMU) members to the new members during 
the sovereign debt crisis and to the non-EMU EU-15 members during both crises. Inter-
estingly, our results show that the new members are those that behave most differently 
in our analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Contagion effects across European government bond markets have become 
a major area of concern for both policymakers and market participants. Policymakers 
are particularly keen to understand the mechanisms that link these markets in order to 
be able to maintain financial stability and make effective monetary policy decisions. 
Likewise, an understanding of bond market linkages can help market participants 
formulate appropriate risk management strategies and investment decisions. This 
interest becomes even greater in years of turmoil, when financial markets are hit by 
extreme shocks. 
In the financial literature, there is no general consensus on the exact meaning 
to be attributed to contagion, while a wide variety of frameworks have been employed 
in the empirical examination of contagion across markets.
1
 European government 
bond markets are no exception here and, since the onset of the sovereign debt crises, 
a growing body of literature has focused on analyzing contagion across these markets. 
For example, in the framework of a structural vector error correction model, de Santis 
(2012) finds that contagion effects in the euro area are linked to ratings. Defining 
* This work was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2015-68367-R 
and ECO2015-66314-R). 
1 Pericoli and Sbracia’s (2003) survey of financial contagion reports the five most common definitions 
of “financial contagion” and Dungey et al. (2005) review alternative methods of testing for the presence 
of contagion during financial market crises and show how such methods are related in a unified frame--
work. 
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contagion as the change in propagation mechanisms when large shocks occur and 
using a Bayesian quantile regression model, Caporin et al. (2013) report no change 
in the intensity of the transmission of shocks among European countries during 
the sovereign debt crisis. A different perspective is given by Metiu (2012), who extends 
the canonical econometric model of contagion proposed by Pesaran and Pick (2007) 
and finds evidence for significant contagion effects among long-term bond yield 
premia after 2008. Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) also report that regional contagion 
was not particularly evident during the 2008–2011 sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
and that the cross-country spillovers of sovereign risk were stronger prior to the crisis 
than during the crisis. Finally, applying the Granger-causality approach and the endoge-
nous breakpoint test, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) provide clear evidence 
of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis in eleven EMU coun-
tries. 
This study assesses contagion in European government bond markets during 
periods of turbulence, when investors and policymakers have a particularly strong 
interest in knowing whether and, if so, how shocks propagate to other countries. 
Following Bae et al. (2003), we use the coexceedance variable—joint occurrences 
of extreme negative and positive returns in different countries on a given day—to 
measure contagion. Bae et al. (2003) capture the coincidence of extreme return 
shocks across countries within a broader region and across regions. They define 
contagion within regions as the fraction of the coexceedance events that cannot 
be explained by fundamentals, and contagion across regions as the fraction of co-
exceedance events that is left unexplained by fundamentals but can be explained by 
exceedances from other countries.
2
 This approach is used by Christiansen and 
Ranaldo (2009) to analyze the financial integration of the stock markets in the ten 
new EU member states comprising former communist countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe as well as the integration of two groups of countries, namely new 
and old member states. In this paper, we are interested in analyzing contagion 
in European government bond markets and in determining the underlying deter-
minants of contagion. We test for contagion (i) across all countries in the sample, 
(ii) within groups of countries and (iii) across groups of countries. To this end, 
we use an ordered logistic regression model to determine the underlying determinants 
of the observed dynamics of contagion.  
Specifically, we address the following questions: First, which factors are asso-
ciated with an increase (decrease) in the probability of observing extreme returns 
across markets? Second, did the effects of these factors change during the financial 
crisis and, subsequently, during the European sovereign debt crisis? Third, is conta-
gion in European government bond markets driven by global (US) or regional (EMU) 
factors? And, are there differences across countries? 
The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, we find 
that contagion in European government bond markets can be explained by interest 
rates, stock market returns and market volatility in both regional and international 
2 Their approach has two advantages. First, contrary to standard correlation measures, it is robust to time-
varying volatility and departure from normality. Second, the correlation coefficient is a linear measure, 
which is inappropriate for analysing nonlinear phenomena, as financial market integration potentially 
might be (see Baur and Schulze, 2005; Dungey and Martin, 2007). 
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stock markets. However, the relevance of these factors is heterogeneous and differs 
between crises. Second, our analysis reveals that contagion has a cluster effect and 
past contagion significantly increases the probability of more episodes of contagion 
today. Third, we find statistically significant evidence of contagion from the “old” 
European Monetary Union  members to the new members during the sovereign debt 
crisis and to the non-EMU EU-15 members during both crises. Finally, we find that 
the new European Union members are those that behave most differently. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present our 
data, while in Section 3 we describe the ordered logit model. In Section 4 we examine 
the determining factors of European government bond market contagion. Finally, we 
conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2. Data 
The data consist of the ten-year JPMorgan Government Global Bond Index 
(JPMGBI), expressed in terms of a common currency, the euro, and the sample 
includes 16 European countries. Our study focuses on ten EMU EU-15 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain)
3
 and six non-EMU countries (Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Sweden and the UK). These bond market indices are transformed into returns 
by taking the first difference of the natural log of each bond price index. All data 
were collected from Thomson Datastream. 
We use daily data for the period from 7 August 2007 to 15 December 2013; 
thus our sample covers the recent years of turmoil (initially the financial crisis and, 
subsequently, the European sovereign debt crisis). We define the starting point 
of the financial crisis as August 2007 (see Mishkin, 2010), when equity markets 
initially fell and central banks started intervening to provide liquidity to financial 
markets. For our analysis, we match the end of the financial crisis with the beginning 
of the European sovereign debt crisis. As pointed out by Christiansen (2014), dating 
the European sovereign debt crisis is not a straightforward task, as no official dates 
are available. Generally, it is considered to have begun in late 2009 (see, for example, 
Alter and Beyer, 2014; Caporin et al., 2013). Therefore, we define the starting point 
of the sovereign debt crisis as January 2010 and it persists until the end of our dataset 
in December 2013.  
Following Bae et al. (2003), we define an extreme return, or exceedance, as 
one that lies either below (above) the 5th (95th) quantile of the marginal return 
distribution. We consider separately the left side of the distribution, or the negative 
return exceedances (“bottom tail”), and the right side, or the positive return exceed-
ances (“top tail”). Similarly, episodes of coexceedance refer to occurrences of extreme 
negative and positive returns in different countries on the same day. We define 
a coexceedance count of i units for negative returns as the joint occurrence of i ex-
ceedances of negative returns on a particular day.  
As is standard in the literature, we have divided the European countries into 
three groups: (1) EMU EU-15 old countries, (2) non-EMU new EU countries and 
(3) non-EMU EU-15 countries. In our study, these groups are composed of the fol- 
 
3 Finland is not included in the study due to a lack of available data. 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics of Exceedances 
 
TOP TAIL BOTTOM TAIL 
 
Financial 
crisis 
Sov debt 
crisis 
z-statis-
tic 
P-value 
Financial 
crisis 
Sov debt 
crisis 
z-statis-
tic 
P-value 
Panel A: EMU EU-15 old countries 
Austria  39 72 0.66 (0.51) 40 67 0.15 (0.88) 
Belgium  49 60 -1.52 (0.13) 45 63 -0.79 (0.43) 
France  41 69 0.18 (0.86) 38 70 0.64 (0.52) 
Germany  44 69 -0.19 (0.85) 35 72 1.18 (0.24) 
Greece  34 82 2.01* (0.05) 24 95 4.05* (0.00) 
Ireland  27 90 3.40* (0.00) 24 91 3.83* (0.00) 
Italy  27 84 3.04* (0.00) 27 81 2.85* (0.00) 
Netherlands 42 67 -0.10 (0.92) 38 69 0.57 (0.57) 
Portugal 14 105 5.58* (0.00) 17 101 5.14* (0.00) 
Spain  30 89 2.96* (0.00) 29 85 2.84* (0.00) 
Panel B: Non-EMU new EU countries 
Czech. Rep. 55 42 -3.81* (0.00) 58 44 -3.94* (0.00) 
Hungary  54 55 -2.53* (0.01) 54 52 -2.79* (0.01) 
Poland 49 38 -3.52* (0.00) 44 47 -2.06* (0.04) 
Panel C: Non-EMU EU-15 countries 
Denmark  32 87 2.58* (0.01) 32 84 2.39* (0.02) 
Sweden 34 79 1.80* (0.07) 43 71 0.08 (0.93) 
UK 46 68 -0.52 (0.61) 52 64 -1.55 (0.12) 
Notes: The financial crisis extends from 7 August 2007 to 31 December 2009 and the sovereign debt crisis 
extends from 1 January 2010 to 15 December 2013. We estimate a logit model where the occurrence 
of exceedances is explained by a constant and a dummy variable indicating the beginning 
of the sovereign debt crisis. The z-statistic tests where the coefficient on the dummy variable is equal 
to zero. * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
lowing countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and the Netherlands (EMU EU-15 old); the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland (non-EMU new EU); and Denmark, Sweden and the UK (non-EMU EU-15).  
Table 1 shows the number of extreme returns in each European government 
bond market on a particular day. We compute the number of positive and negative 
exceedances for the financial crisis (from 7 August 2007 to 31 December 2009) 
and for the European sovereign crisis (from 1 January 2010 to 15 December 2013) 
separately. To test for differences in the number of exceedances during both periods, 
we estimate a logit model where the occurrence of exceedances is explained by 
a constant and a dummy variable indicating the beginning of the sovereign debt 
crisis.
4
 The distribution of negative and positive exceedances is largely symmetrical. 
As expected, the logit results show that the number of exceedances (negative 
and positive) is significantly higher during the sovereign debt crisis than during 
the financial crisis for all peripheral bond markets (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
 
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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and Spain). The logit results also show that the number of exceedances in the central 
bond markets (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) does not 
differ significantly between the two crises and in the non-EMU EU-15 countries 
the results are heterogeneous, depending on the country and the tail of the distribu-
tion. Finally, the number of exceedances in the non-EMU new EU countries is, 
in general, significantly higher during the financial crisis than during the sovereign 
debt crisis. As Abad and Chuliá (2013) suggest, these markets appear to be more 
strongly influenced by US news than they are by European news and, therefore, were 
more exposed to the financial crisis than to the sovereign debt crisis.  
As for differences across countries, the bond markets of the peripheral coun-
tries show more exceedances than the other bond markets during the sovereign 
debt crisis and fewer during the financial crisis, though this is not surprising given 
that these countries were most affected by the euro-area sovereign debt crisis. 
On the whole, there are no great differences in the number of exceedances across 
the central countries, non-EMU new EU countries and non-EMU EU-15 countries, 
regardless of the particular crisis. 
2.1 Explanatory Variables 
We examine five main hypotheses relating market conditions to the likeli-
hood of coexceedances and, to this end, we use a large set of explanatory variables. 
First, several arguments such as the flight-to-quality proposed by Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2008) and the liquidity spirals proposed by Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) suggest a relation between equities, money market instruments 
and bonds in turbulent periods. In line with these arguments, we would expect 
contagion in bond markets to be connected to the stock and money markets. To test 
this hypothesis, we include daily returns of the Euro Stoxx 50 and the three-month 
interbank interest rate (Euribor). 
Second, according to Cristiansen and Ranaldo (2009), the propagation of shocks 
is more likely in a highly volatile environment. Thus, the hypothesis to be tested is 
whether contagion is strengthened when volatility is pervasively high in the financial 
markets. As a proxy of European financial market volatility, we use the VSTOXX 
index (which measures implied volatility in the Euro Stoxx 50 index options).  
Third, given the pivotal role of monetary policy in determining bond returns, 
it is likely that monetary policy impacts the bond returns in each country (Bredin 
et al., 2010). Thus, we examine whether contagion can be attributed to the release 
of monetary policy announcements. To test this hypothesis, we include the “surprise” 
or the unexpected component of the news announcements
5
 released by the ECB. 
Fourth, we define a cluster effect when past contagion significantly increases 
the probability of more contagion today.
6
 To test this hypothesis, we include a pre-
vious coexceedance in the model as an explanatory variable. A positive value for this 
variable indicates higher probabilities of observing a coexceedance today if a coex-
ceedance occurred the previous day.  
5 An important common finding in the extant literature is that only the surprise component of monetary 
policy has a significant effect on asset returns, whereas the effect of expected policy actions is statistically 
insignificant (see Bomfim, 2003, and Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005, among others). 
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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Finally, with the aim of distinguishing regional factors from global factors, 
the fourth group of variables is associated with the US. These variables are the return 
of the US stock market (S&P500 Composite index), the three-month Treasury 
bill rate, the US stock return volatility proxied by the VIX index (which measures 
implied volatility in Standard and Poor’s 500 index options) and the “surprise” or 
unexpected component of the news announcements released by the Federal Reserve 
Bank (Fed).
 
The hypotheses to be tested are (i) whether there is a relation between 
European and US assets similar to that between European asset classes, (ii) whether 
higher volatility in international financial markets increases contagion and, (iii) whether 
US monetary policy surprises are a source of contagion in European government 
bond markets. 
To obtain a measure of the surprise in the Fed announcements we use 
the methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001). For an event taking place on day d, 
the unexpected or “surprise” target rate change can be calculated as the change 
in the rate implied by the current-month futures contract, scaled up by a factor related 
to the number of days in the month affected by the change. In sum, we compute 
the unexpected target rate change or the “surprise” as 
                                            [ ] ( )1/ ( ) d dS D D d f f −= − ⋅ −                                            (1) 
 
where fd is the current-month futures rate at the end of the announcement day d and  
D is the number of days in the month. Kuttner (2001) uses a scaled version of the one- 
day change in the current-month federal funds future rate because in the US the futures 
contract’s payoff depends on the monthly average federal funds rate, and the scaled 
factor is included to reflect the number of days remaining in the month that are 
affected by the change. This scaled factor is not required to obtain a measure of the sur-
prise in the ECB announcement and, following Bredin et al. (2007), we proxy sur-
prises in ECB policy rates using the one-day change in the three-month Euribor 
futures rate.
7
 The data for the monetary policy-related variables are provided by 
Bloomberg. 
3. The Model 
Our aim is to identify the underlying determinants of contagion in European 
government bond markets and to determine whether their importance varies across 
and within groups of countries and across time. Here, we define a coexceedance as 
a variable that counts the number of large negative (large positive) returns on a given 
day across countries. To capture the probabilities associated with this polychotomous 
variable, Bae et al. (2003) use a multinomial logistic regression model that allows 
them to condition on attributes and characteristics of the exceedance events using 
control variables (or covariates). However, in so doing, they discard information, 
since multinomial logit ignores the ordered aspect of the outcome. To avoid this prob-
lem, we use the ordered logit model, which provides a means to exploit the ordering 
information. 
7 Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) find that the three-month Euribor futures rate is an unbiased predictor 
of euro-area policy rate changes. 
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Defining ty
∗
 as a latent variable (the level of contagion), 'txɶ  as a vector of the ex-
planatory variables discussed in Section 2, β as a vector of unknown parameters 
and epsilon as an error term, the ordered logit model is given by: 
                                                         
'
t t ty x ε
∗ = +βɶ          (2) 
The observation y is assumed to be related to the continuous latent variable 
y∗  by:  
0
0 1
1 2
0 if
1 if
2 if ...
y y
y y
y y
µ
µ µ
µ µ
∗
∗
∗
= ≤
= < ≤
= < ≤
 
where y is the ordered measure of the level of contagion (coexceedance) and μ 
the vector of unknown threshold parameters. We assume that ε has a standard logistic 
distribution and then:  
                               
( ) ( ) ( )1Pr t t i t i ty i x x xΦ µ Φ µ −= = − − −β βɶ ɶ ɶ                               (3) 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal. The vector of the slopes β is not indexed 
by the category index c, thus the effects of the covariates are constant across response 
categories. A positive coefficient implies an increase in the log of the probability 
ratio, indicating that higher values of the explanatory variables imply a higher proba-
bility of observing a higher number of coexceedances (contagion). Similarly, a negative 
coefficient implies a lower probability of observing a higher number of coex-
ceedances. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood and goodness-of-fit 
is measured using McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-R
2
 approach and testing the overall 
significance.  
We estimate the model separately for positive and negative coexceedances to 
allow the factors to have different effects on each tail. As we are also interested 
in determining whether the effects of the factors differ during the financial and 
the European sovereign debt crises, we estimate the model separately for both periods. 
We used the regression parameters and each mean variable to generate predicted 
probabilities of possible coexceedances. This was done twice, first fixing the finan-
cial crisis and then fixing the sovereign debt crisis. We test for contagion (i) across 
all countries in the sample, (ii) within groups of countries and (iii) across groups 
of countries.  
4. Determinants of European Government Bond Market Contagion 
4.1 Contagion across All Countries 
Table 2 shows the estimates of the ordered logit model for the top and bottom 
tails for all the countries considered together. To test the relation between markets, 
we include both European Union money and stock market variables. Our findings 
show that the Euribor is a statistically important covariate for both positive and 
negative coexceedances during the sovereign debt crisis and that the European stock 
market only appears to be useful in explaining positive coexceedances during 
the sovereign debt crisis.  
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Table 2  Contagion Across Countries 
 
TOP TAIL BOTTOM TAIL 
 
Financial crisis Sov debt crisis Financial crisis Sov debt crisis 
COt-1 0.12* (0.00) 0.17* (0.00) 0.11* (0.00) 0.13* (0.00) ECBtSR  -14.42 (0.98) -0.43 (0.56) -0.65 (0.56) -1.78 (0.10) EMUtR  0.00 (0.97) 0.38* (0.02) 0.08 (0.36) 0.50* (0.00) EMUtS  0.67 (0.89) 9.85* (0.05) 2.08 (0.68) 6.30 (0.20) 
V2Xt -0.01 (0.75) 0.19* (0.00) 0.10* (0.00) 0.15* (0.00) 
−
1FEDtSR  -0.42 (0.53)   0.93 (0.14)   
−
1UStR  -0.40* (0.01) -0.59 (0.67) -0.43* (0.01) -0.86 (0.53) 
−
1UStS  -10.12* (0.01) 5.70 (0.35) 3.18 (0.45) -12.79* (0.03) 
VIXt-1 0.05* (0.08) -0.15* (0.00) -0.05 (0.12) -0.11* (0.00) 
χ2 143.88 (0.00) 185.62 (0.00) 152.74 (0.00) 163.14 (0.00) 
Likelihood -689.92 
 
-1362.65 
 
672.49 
 
-1369.63 
 
R2 0.09 
 
0.06 
 
0.10 
 
0.06 
 
Prob y = 0 70% 
 
55% 
 
72% 
 
57% 
 
Prob y = 1 17% 
 
23% 
 
17% 
 
20% 
 
Prob y > 1 13% 
 
22% 
 
12% 
 
22% 
 
Notes: The number of coexceedances of daily returns (CO) is modeled as an ordered logit. 
ECBtSR and 
−
1FEDtSR refer to monetary policy surprises announced by the ECB and the Fed, respectively; 
EAtR  
and 
−
1UStR  refer to the three-month interbank interest rate (Euribor) and the three-month Treasury bill 
rate, respectively; 
EAtS  and 
−
1UStS  refer to the Euro Stoxx 50 index returns and the S&P500 index 
returns, respectively; and V2X and VIX refer to the VSTOXX index and VIX index, respectively.  
χ
2 refers to the statistic to test that the model considered provided a better fit than the null model with 
no independent variables. R2 refers to McFadden’s pseudo-R2. During the sovereign debt crisis, no 
surprises were announced by the Fed. Prob denotes the adjusted probabilities (from the ordered logit 
model) that the number of exceedances is equal to 0, 1 or more than 1. We consider that no surprises 
were announced by the ECB or the FED and hold the other variables at their means. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
In general, our results confirm the hypothesis that shock propagation increases 
in a highly volatile European environment during both crises. We also find strong 
evidence for the presence of a cluster effect during both crises and in both tails. 
The positive and significant coefficients of the previous coexceedance show that 
there is a higher probability of observing a coexceedance today if a coexceedance 
occurred the previous day.  
In addition, we examine whether some fraction of the coexceedance events 
in European government bond markets can be explained by the explanatory variables 
associated with the US, i.e. whether global factors have an effect on contagion.
8
 Our 
results show that, in general, the likelihood of observing coexceedances is negatively 
8 Owing to timing conventions (European markets close before their US counterpart), US explanatory 
variables enter the model lagged one period. Similar to Bae et al. (2003), we interpret these results as 
evidence of the predictability of coexceedances. 
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related to the US interest rate and stock market. US volatility is helpful for predicting 
contagion across European government bond markets. However, the effect of the vola-
tility during the sovereign debt crisis is negative, suggesting that the higher the US 
volatility yesterday, the less likely we are to observe episodes of coexceedance 
in European government markets today.
9
  
An examination of the impact of unexpected news announcements released by 
the ECB and the Fed shows that they are not useful in explaining contagion in any 
tail. This result is consistent with that of Connolly and Wang (2003), who show that 
the bulk of the observed comovement in international equity markets cannot be 
attributed to public information about economic fundamentals.  
As expected, our results also show that the probability of contagion (the proba-
bility of exceedances being more than 1) is higher during the sovereign debt crisis 
than during the financial crisis. Finally, the chi-square test indicates that all the models 
considered provided a better fit than the null model with no independent variables 
when predicting cumulative probabilities of contagion.  
4.2 Contagion within Groups of Countries 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the ordered logit model for the top and bottom 
tails when we group the countries as is standard in the literature: EMU EU-15 old 
countries (Panel A), non-EMU new EU countries (Panel B), and non-EMU EU-15 
countries (Panel C). If we consider the old members, the results are similar
10
 to those 
in Table 2, but now the European stock market appears to be useful in explaining 
both positive and negative coexceedances during both crises.  
The results for the non-EMU new EU countries reveal three important dif-
ferences with respect to the old members. First, there appears to be no relation 
between European interest rates and contagion within these countries. Second, 
in general, US assets fail to provide an adequate explanation of the probability of co-
exceedances within these bond markets. Third, the probability of contagion is higher 
during the financial crisis than during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Finally, our results for the non-EMU EU-15 countries (Panel C, Table 3) 
show that what distinguishes them most obviously from the old members is that 
shock propagation only increases in a highly volatile European environment during 
the sovereign debt crisis.  
4.3 Contagion across Groups of Countries 
We are also interested in testing whether contagion within the group of old 
EMU members can help predict contagion within the other groups of countries. We 
define contagion across groups of countries as the fraction of the coexceedance 
events in each group of countries that is left unexplained by its own covariates but is 
explained by coexceedances within the group of old members.  
Our results in Table 4 show that our findings on contagion within groups 
of countries (see Table 3) are robust to the inclusion of the coexceedances within 
 
9 Bae et al. (2003) also find that the effect of US conditional volatility on the probability of contagion 
in Latin America is negative. 
10 Ten of the 16 countries in the sample belong to this category of “old countries”. 
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Table 3  Contagion within Groups of Countries 
 
TOP TAIL BOTTOM TAIL 
 
Financial crisis Sov debt crisis Financial crisis Sov debt crisis 
Panel A: EMU EU-15 old countries 
COt-1 -0.29* (0.06) -0.25* (0.00) -0.41 (0.16) -0.37* (0.00) ECBtSR  -11.38 (0.98) -0.71 (0.39) -0.01 (1.00) -1.37 (0.21) EMUtR  0.09 (0.49) 0.63* (0.00) 0.05 (0.67) 0.80* (0.00) EMUtS  -34.62* (0.00) 9.04* (0.09) 29.74* (0.00) 9.46* (0.08) 
V2Xt -0.09* (0.08) 0.19* (0.00) 0.10* (0.05) 0.15* (0.00) 
−
1FEDtSR  -0.44 (0.63)   1.56* (0.03)   
−
1UStR  -0.61* (0.02) -1.22 (0.41) -0.27 (0.21) -1.04 (0.48) 
−
1UStS  -13.04* (0.02) 1.20 (0.85) 5.76 (0.32) -11.19* (0.07) 
VIXt-1 0.12* (0.01) -0.15* (0.00) -0.06 (0.19) -0.11* (0.00) 
χ2 68.06 (0.00) 128.23 (0.00) 51.40 (0.00) 139.57 (0.00) 
Likelihood -346.17 
 
-1124.83 
 
-358.99 
 
-1130.40 
 
R2 0.09 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
0.06 
 
Prob y = 0 92% 
 
66% 
 
90% 
 
67% 
 
Prob y = 1 2% 
 
17% 
 
  3% 
 
17% 
 
Prob y > 1 6% 
 
17% 
 
  6% 
 
17% 
 
Panel B: Non-EMU new EU countries 
COt-1 0.32* (0.06) 0.13 (0.55) 0.25 (0.14) 0.32* (0.07) ECBtSR  -14.07 (0.99) -0.10 (0.93) -12.93 (0.99) -12.07 (0.98) EMUtR  -0.08 (0.43) -0.10 (0.76) 0.04 (0.75) -0.30 (0.35) EMUtS  40.87* (0.00) 59.50* (0.00) -35.88* (0.00) -39.38* (0.00) 
V2Xt 0.04 (0.34) 0.17* (0.00) 0.06 (0.15) 0.15* (0.00) 
−
1FEDtSR  -0.54 (0.63)   -0.51 (0.58)   
−
1UStR  -0.03 (0.88) 0.58 (0.80) -0.38* (0.07) -2.18 (0.38) 
−
1UStS  5.87 (0.28) -7.43 (0.44) 1.67 (0.76) -8.30 (0.42) 
VIXt-1 0.01 (0.79) -0.12* (0.01) -0.01 (0.74) -0.11* (0.02) 
χ2 118.63 (0.00) 83.11 (0.00) 140.47 (0.00) 113.08 (0.00) 
Likelihood -324.63 
 
-367.34 
 
-308.73 
 
-355.89 
 
R2 0.15 
 
0.10 
 
0.19 
 
0.14 
 
Prob y = 0 86% 
 
92% 
 
87% 
 
93% 
 
Prob y = 1 11% 
 
  7% 
 
10% 
 
  5% 
 
Prob y > 1 4% 
 
  1% 
 
  3% 
 
  2% 
 
Panel C: Non-EMU EU-15 countries 
COt-1 0.10 (0.64) 0.29* (0.06) 0.46* (0.01) 0.33* (0.02) ECBtSR  -13.29 (0.99) 0.10 (0.93) 0.03 (0.98) -13.12 (0.98) 
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EMUtR  -0.07 (0.60) 0.46* (0.09) 0.15 (0.23) -0.15 (0.56) EMUtS  -21.20* (0.00) -55.96* (0.00) 6.39 (0.29) 63.08* (0.00) 
V2Xt -0.05 (0.21) 0.17* (0.00) 0.03 (0.46) 0.09* (0.01) 
−
1FEDtSR  -0.40 (0.61)   1.48* (0.02)   
−
1UStR  -0.65* (0.02) 1.67 (0.43) -0.89* (0.00) -1.79 (0.38) 
−
1UStS  5.57 (0.28) 14.88 (0.10) 8.35* (0.09) -7.22 (0.42) 
VIXt-1 0.09* (0.03) -0.15* (0.00) 0.00 (1.00) -0.08* (0.07) 
χ2 84.65 (0.00) 179.70 (0.00) 99.17 (0.00) 108.10 (0.00) 
Likelihood -270.73 
 
-476.77 
 
-289.00 
 
-501.81 
 
R2 0.14 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
 
0.10 
 
Prob y = 0 90% 
 
89% 
 
90% 
 
88% 
 
Prob y = 1 8% 
 
  7% 
 
  8% 
 
  8% 
 
Prob y > 1 2% 
 
  4% 
 
  2% 
 
  4% 
 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
 
the group of old members as an explanatory variable. The contagion test for the new 
members is presented in Panel A of Table 4. The regression coefficient on the number 
of coexceedances in the old countries is significant during the sovereign debt crisis. 
This means that during that crisis, there are higher probabilities of observing con-
tagion within the new members today if contagion has occurred in the old countries. 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the probability of contagion within the group 
of new members is higher during the financial crisis than during the sovereign debt 
crisis. 
If we consider contagion from the old members to the non-EMU EU-15 
countries (Panel B, Table 4), we find that the regression coefficient on the number 
of coexceedances in the old countries is positive and significant during both crises 
and in both tails. This positive relationship indicates that both groups of countries are 
connected even though they do not share a common currency.  
Finally, although the use of McFadden’s pseudo-R
2
 for comparison across 
models has some limitations (Greene, 2000), in general we observe that McFadden’s 
pseudo- R
2
 is higher during the financial crisis than during the sovereign debt crisis, 
especially in the models that analyze contagion across groups of countries.  
5. Conclusions 
Using the coexceedance measure proposed by Bae et al. (2003), we have 
analyzed contagion in European government bond markets. Specifically, we have 
tested for contagion (i) across all countries in the sample, (ii) within groups of coun-
tries and (iii) across groups of countries. To this end, we have used an ordered 
logistic regression model to analyze the underlying determinants of the dynamics 
of contagion. 
We report evidence that interest rates, stock market returns and market vola-
tility in both regional and international stock markets are statistically important 
covariates that help explain contagion in European government bond markets. 
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Table 4  Contagion across Groups of Countries 
 
TOP TAIL BOTTOM TAIL 
 
Financial crisis Sov debt crisis Financial crisis Sov debt crisis 
Panel A: Non-EMU new EU countries 
COt-1 0.30* (0.08) 0.02 (0.93) 0.24 (0.15) 0.24 (0.18) ECBtSR  -13.73 (0.98) 0.11 (0.92) -12.95 (0.99) -13.12 (0.99) EMUtR  -0.08 (0.48) -0.19 (0.54) 0.03 (0.76) -0.41 (0.21) EMUtS  39.08* (0.00) 57.41* (0.00) -36.14* (0.00) -39.52* (0.00) 
V2Xt 0.03 (0.51) 0.14* (0.00) 0.06 (0.17) 0.14* (0.00) 
−
1FEDtSR  -0.66 (0.56)   -0.56 (0.56)   
−
1UStR  -0.05 (0.78) 0.74 (0.75) -0.38* (0.07) -1.85 (0.46) 
−
1UStS  6.99 (0.20) -7.16 (0.46) 1.60 (0.77) -7.21 (0.47) 
VIXt-1 0.03 (0.51) -0.10* (0.04) -0.01 (0.76) -0.09* (0.05) 
CO_Oldt -0.13 (0.10) 0.23* (0.00) 0.02 (0.76) 0.25* (0.00) 
χ2 121.96 (0.00) 93.64 (0.00) 140.56 (0.00) 126.01 (0.00) 
Likelihood -322.96 
 
-362.08 
 
-308.69 
 
-349.43 
 
R2 0.16 
 
0.11 
 
0.19 
 
0.15 
 
Prob y = 0 86% 
 
92% 
 
87% 
 
93% 
 
Prob y = 1 11% 
 
  7% 
 
10% 
 
  5% 
 
Prob y > 1   4% 
 
  1% 
 
  3% 
 
  2% 
 
Panel B: Non-EMU EU-15 countries 
COt-1 -0.01 (0.95) 0.35* (0.03) 0.36* (0.07) 0.42* (0.01) ECBtSR  -12.24 (0.98) 0.55 (0.62) -1.33 (0.38) -13.30 (0.98) EMUtR  -0.17 (0.25) 0.15 (0.58) 0.08 (0.59) -0.43 (0.13) EMUtS  -5.50 (0.45) -58.34* (0.00) -14.69* (0.03) 70.70* (0.00) 
V2Xt -0.01 (0.90) 0.11* (0.01) -0.07 (0.11) 0.08* (0.04) 
−
1FEDtSR  0.07 (0.93)   0.50 (0.50)   
−
1UStR  -0.57* (0.06) 2.44 (0.27) -1.25* (0.00) -0.70 (0.75) 
−
1UStS  -0.96 (0.86) 12.03 (0.23) 9.87* (0.07) -1.16 (0.91) 
VIXt-1 0.04 (0.39) -0.10* (0.03) 0.09* (0.03) -0.11* (0.02) 
CO_Oldt 0.44* (0.00) 0.54* (0.00) 0.75* (0.00) 0.73* (0.00) 
χ2 151.90 (0.00) 263.08 (0.00) 242.48 (0.00) 269.11 (0.00) 
Likelihood -237.11 
 
-435.07 
 
-217.35 
 
-421.30 
 
R2 0.24 
 
0.23 
 
0.36 
 
0.24 
 
Prob y = 0 91% 
 
90% 
 
93% 
 
90% 
 
Prob y = 1   8% 
 
  7% 
 
  6% 
 
  8% 
 
Prob y > 1   1% 
 
  3% 
 
  1% 
 
  2% 
 
Notes: See note to Table 2. CO_Oldt refers to the number of coexceedances in old countries 
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Nevertheless, the relevance of these variables is heterogeneous and differs between 
crises. In addition, we find evidence indicating that past contagion significantly 
increases the probability of more contagion today. Third, we find that the probability 
of contagion among the non-EMU new EU members has a statistically signifi- 
cant relationship with coexceedances occurring among the old members during 
the sovereign debt crisis and in the case of non-EMU EU-15 members during both 
crises. Finally, we find that the new European Union members are those that behave 
most differently. 
Our results should enable market participants to make effective investment 
decisions, given that they need to have an understanding of the way in which extreme 
shocks propagate across European government bond markets and of the factors under-
lying contagion. Additionally, our findings have two policy implications. First, our 
results show that the probability of contagion was higher for the new EMU members 
during the financial crisis and for the rest of members during the sovereign debt 
crisis. This result indicates the need for stabilization mechanisms to avoid contagion, 
though individual countries ought to consider what their main source of contagion is. 
Second, since we have found that both money markets and stock markets are impor-
tant determinants of sovereign debt market contagion, policy regulators should make 
an effort to control all financial markets simultaneously. The link between money 
markets and contagion is especially important since interest rates were the most 
frequently employed monetary policy tool in response to the crises. 
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